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Abstract
Consider several disjoint social networks. What is the minimum number of
bridges (i.e. edges between nodes belonging to different social networks) or central
nodes (those who are endpoints to a bridge) required so that every two nodes are
connected by a path of length at most k? The answer depends only linearly on
the size of the social networks for k = 2, and does not depend on the size of each
social network for k ≥ 3. Our findings provide an equality of opportunity measure
for social networks which is easy to compute and verify, and which can be used
to compare the degree of integration of a variety of real-life social networks.
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1. Relevance
Our social networks are highly clustered, meaning that is common to observe commu-
nities that are very densely connected within themselves but only poorly so with the
rest of the social network (Watts and Strogatz, 1998; Mishra et al., 2007). The people
in each community usually share particular characteristics, such as race, ethnicity or
educational background. For example, the average American public school student has
less than one school friend of another race (Fryer, 2007). Among white Americans, 91%
of people comprising their social networks are also white, while for black and latino
Americans the percentages are 83% and 64%, respectively (Cox et al., 2016). Social
networks are also highly clustered by religion, political views, and education, among
other characteristics (Louch, 2000).
The fact that we are segregated into these poorly interconnected societies has signif-
icant consequences. Many important decisions such as who we marry, who we work for,
and what information we obtain crucially depend on who we know or who our friends
and our acquaintances know. We are incredibly likely to marry someone within our
extended social circles (at least until the emergence of online dating, see Rosenfeld and
Thomas, 2012 and Ortega and Hergovich, 2017). It is also well-documented that over
50% of jobs are obtained through social contacts (Rees, 1966; Corcoran et al., 1980;
Granovetter, 1973, 1995), and that the connections we possess may explain the observed
drop-out rates of the labor force (Topa, 2001; Calvo´-Armengol and Jackson, 2004). Fur-
thermore, our social circle determines the information to which we are exposed to online
(Bakshy et al., 2012). Therefore, the lack of connections between communities can for-
bid that some agents interact with others, making them lose potential job opportunities,
valuable information, or potential romantic partners.
In this paper, we study the minimum number of inter-community connections re-
quired so that every agent in the social network has access to the entire social network,
thus guaranteeing that every agent has the same networking opportunities. To do so,
we assume that each agent can only interact with another agent who is connected to
her within k steps, i.e. connected by a path of length at most k. For example, k = 1
means that agents can only interact (work, marry, communicate, etcetera) with people
whom they directly know. Similarly, k = 2 means that agents can interact with people
who they either know directly, or with whom they have a friend in common, and so on.
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Given k, the question we ask is how many connections between communities (which
we call bridges) are required to guarantee that any two people in the social network are
k-connected? And how many agents must know someone outside their community, i.e.
how many agents must be central? In this paper, we provide answers to both questions
for all values of k as a function of the number and the size of the communities conforming
a social network. We obtain tight values, which guarantee that if we remove one bridge
or one central agent, there must be at least two nodes that are not connected by a path
of length k. In this case, we say that the social network fails to be k-integrated. Because
we study lower bounds on the number of bridges and nodes, we impose without loss of
generality that every community is completely connected within, i.e. the corresponding
graph of each community is complete.
The notion of k-integration for social networks that we propose, which requires
that any two nodes are connected by a path of at most length k, is inspired in the
prominent literature of equality of opportunity in philosophy and economics (Roemer,
2009; Arneson, 2015). If a social network is k-integrated, every agent has the same
access to job opportunities, information, romantic partners, and so on, irrespective
of their location within the network and the community to which the agent belongs.
Our results allow us to identify when a social network fails our proposed criterion of
opportunity fairness in networks, which is parametrized by k, simply by either counting
the number of connections between communities or the number of agents who have such
connections. It also allows us to compare social networks on the basis of k-integration.
We find that the number of bridges (Bk) and central agents (Ck) needed for k-
integration quickly diminishes as k becomes larger, and does not depend on the size
of each community for k ≥ 3. To give an example, consider a social network with 8
communities, each containing 1,000 agents. For 1−integration, we require 28 million
bridges and 8 thousand central agents, whereas for 2−integration we only require 7
thousand bridges and 7 thousand and 1 central agents. Furthermore, for 3−integration
we only require 28 bridges and 8 central agents. The intuition behind our result is that
as k grows, the externality generated by each bridge and central node increases. It is
nevertheless surprising that the externalities of a bridge are so large with k = 3 that
to cover such a large social network we only need that 0.00010% of the total possible
bridges and 0.1% of the total nodes to be central. Figure 2 provides an illustration for
a social network with 8 communities with 9 agents each.
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(a) B1 = 2268, C1 = 72 (b) B2 = 63, C2 = 64 (c) B3 = 28, C≥3 = 8
(d) B4 = 12 (e) B5 = 10 (f) B6 = B8 = 8 (g) B≥9 = 7
Figure 1: Minimal k-integrated social networks with 8 communities of 9 agents each.
Bridges and central nodes appear in blue. Communities are indicated with dashed triangles. The size
and location of nodes are irrelevant and for exposition only.
Our result is related to the small world phenomenon in Watts and Strogatz (1998).
They note that regular graphs (e.g. a lattice) are highly clustered but exhibit long
characteristic path lengths. On the contrary, random graphs in which edges are created
independently at random, have short characteristic path lengths but are not clustered.
However, if we start from a regular graph and we randomly rewire each edge with
some probability, we quickly obtain a graph that is both highly clustered and exhibit
short characteristic path lengths, two properties of many real-life networks. Our result
is similar to theirs in spirit, but instead of looking at characteristic or expected path
lengths, we strictly require that each path length is at most k. Although a random
graph may exhibit a short characteristic path length, it may still have a few edges
that are very poorly connected to the rest of the social network. Thus, our integration
measure ensures that all agents are well-connected to the network, unlike expected or
characteristic path length. We quantify the specific number of bridges and central nodes
needed to ensure that all paths are of length at most k.
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Ortega and Hergovich (2017) also obtain a similar result using random graphs,
which they use to analyze the impact of online dating in the number of interracial
marriages. They show that for k ≥ 2, a few bridges can quickly make a social network
2-integrated, leading to a phase transition in the number of agents who decide to marry
interracially. In this paper, we focus instead on deterministic graphs and compute the
minimal number of bridges and central nodes required to guarantee k-integration for all
values of k. This paper contributes to explaining the phase transition in their model,
by showing that just a few bridges can ensure that the society is k-integrated for k ≥ 2.
Furthermore, it provides an easy way to check whether a social network may experience
such a phase transition simply by counting the number of bridges or central agents in
a society.1
2. Definitions and Model
Basic Definitions. An undirected graph or network2 is an ordered pair F = (N,E)
consisting of a set of nodes N = {a, b, c, . . .} and a set of edges E = {ab, ac, . . .}.
The set of edges consists of unordered pairs of nodes. Two nodes a, b are adjacent
if ab ∈ E, and we say that a and b are the endpoints of edge ab. A graph in which
every two different nodes are adjacent is called complete. A graph F ′ = (N ′, E ′) is
a supergraph of F if N ⊆ N ′ and E ⊆ E ′. Two graphs are disjoint if they share
no nodes. A path from node i to t is a vector of edges (ij, jk, . . . , qs, st) such that
every consecutive edges share an endpoint. The path length is the number of edges
in a path. The distance between two nodes is the length of the shortest path between
them. Two graphs are connected if there exists a path between any of their nodes,
and disconnected otherwise.
Model. We consider r disjoint complete graphsK1 = (N1, E1), K2 = (N2, E2), . . . , Kr =
(Nr, Er), all with n nodes. Each complete graph is called a local graph, and its edges
are called local edges. A global graph G = (NG, EG) is a supergraph of the union
of all local graphs, so that
r⋃
i=1
Ni ⊆ NG and
r⋃
i=1
Ei ⊆ EG. The notation Ki ∪Kj denotes
the supergraph (Ni ∪Nj, Ei ∪ Ej). We assume n ≥ r.
1The MIT Technology Review (2017) provides an excellent overview of the Ortega and Hergovich
findings for a general audience.
2I use both terms indistinctly.
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A bridge is an edge of a global graph whose endpoints belong to different local
graphs.3 A node is central if its an endpoint of a bridge. B and C denote the number
of bridges and central nodes in a global graph, respectively. Figure 2 presents an
example of a global graph with two bridges and four central nodes.
Figure 2: A global graph with n = 4, r = 3, B = 2 and C = 4.
We propose the following notion of integration for global graphs.
Definition 1 (Integration in Graphs). A global graph is k-integrated if there exists a
path of length at most k between any two nodes. A global graph that is not k-integrated
is k-segregated.
This paper studies the minimum number of bridges and central agents that a global
graph or network requires to be k-integrated. These are presented in the following
Theorem.
3. Result
Theorem 1. A global graph is k-segregated if B < Bk or C < Ck. The values for Bk
and Ck are given in the table below and are tight, i.e. for any values of r and n there
exist an k-integrated global graph with B = Bk and C = Ck.
where f(r) is a function of r that does not depend on n.
We separate the proof in three parts. First, we show that a global graph is k-
segregated if B < Bk. Second, we show that C < Ck. Third, we show that one can
3The standard definition of a bridge is an edge whose removal would disconnect the graph (Diestel,
2017). Nevertheless, I redefine this term to make exposition clearer.
6
k Bk Ck
1 n2r(r − 1)/2 rn
2 (r − 1)n (r − 1)n+ 1
3 r(r − 1)/2 r
... f(r) r
r + 1 r − 1 r
always construct a k-integrated local graph with exactly Bk bridges and Ck central
nodes, for any values of r and n.
Proof of Minimality of Bk. For k = 1, order all local graphs randomly. Each node in
the first local graph needs to be adjacent to n nodes in each of the (r− 1) local graphs.
Each node in the second local graph needs to be connected to n nodes in each of the
remaining (r − 2) local graphs, and so on. A simple computation yields
n
r−1∑
i=1
i · n = n2
r(r − 1)
2
(1)
For k = 2, I start by showing the following Lemma: Let A = (N1, E1) and
B = (N2, E2) be two disjoint graphs with n1 and n2 nodes. Then Bk = min(n1, n2).
Otherwise, there are two nodes x ∈ N1, y ∈ N2 such that both are not central. Thus,
it is impossible to make a path of length at most 2 connecting x and y.
Now I show that the global graph must have B2 = (r − 1)n by constructing such
graph. Start with a global graph containing all r local graphs K1, K2, . . . , Kr and no
bridges. To ensure that every node in K1 is 2-integrated toK2 we need n bridges, by the
previous Lemma. Similarly, we need n bridges to 2-integrateK1∪K2 andK3 (remember
that we started from a graph with 0 bridges), n bridges to 2-integrate K1 ∪ K2 ∪ K3
and K4, ..., and n bridges to 2-connect
r−1⋃
i=1
Ki and Kr. This is the minimal number of
bridges we need to construct to ensure that the graph is 2-connected. In fact, if the
bridges are created in a particular way, we do not need any bridges connecting any two
local graphs Ki, Kj for i 6= j 6= 1. We show this when presenting an example showing
that this bound is tight.
For k = 3, assume that two local graphs K1 and K2 are not directly connected by a
bridge, i.e. ∄x ∈ K1, y ∈ K2 such that xy ∈ B. Then, for that graph to be 3-integrated,
all the n nodes of K1 must be directly connected to a local graph K3 that is connected
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to K2 by a bridge. Thus, for each two local graphs that are not directly connected, we
need n bridges. Now suppose that all but one local graph are directly connected by a
bridge. The total number of bridges is n+ (r−1)(r−2)
2
, whereas if every two local graphs
were directly connected by a bridge the total number of bridges would be r(r−1)
2
. A
quick computation makes evident (recall n ≥ r) that
r(r − 1)
2
< n +
(r − 1)(r − 2)
2
(2)
Finally, for k > 3, note that Bk ≥ Bk+1. Therefore, Bk ≤
r(r−1)
2
for k > 3, which is
itself a function of r which does not depend on n. Finally, note that for k = r + 1, we
need at least a path between any two nodes. This means that all but two local graphs
must be directly connected by a bridge to at least one other local graph. If Br+1 < r−1,
then there are two local graphs that are not connected by any path, a contradiction.
This concludes the proof of minimality of Bk.
Now we show that a global graph is k-segregated if C < Ck.
Proof of Minimality of Ck. For k = 1 every agent needs to be central so the proof is
trivial.
For k = 2, suppose by contradiction that there are only (r − 1)n central nodes in a
2-integrated global graph, i.e. there are n non-central nodes. Then either all those non-
central nodes belong to a whole local graph, which is then disconnected from the rest
of the global graph (a contradiction), or there are two nodes from different local graphs
that are not central. The shortest path between those has length 3, a contradiction.
For k ≥ 3 the proof is also trivial: if there are less than r central nodes then at least
one local graph is disconnected from the rest of the global graph.
Finally, I discuss how to construct global graphs that are k-integrated with exactly
B = Bk and C = Ck, showing that these values are tight.
Proof of Sufficiency of Bk and Ck. For k = 1, we trivially require that every node is
central and that any two nodes belonging to different communities are directly con-
nected by a bridge (see subfigure 1a in the Introduction).
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For k = 2, we can achieve the lower bounds B2 = (r− 1)n and C2 = (r− 1)n+1 by
selecting one local graph that has only one central node. This node connects to all other
nodes of different communities, and by our assumption also to every node in his own
community. This way we create a “2-integrated star graph” which is by construction
2-integrated. An example appears in Figure 3 (and in subfigure 1b in the Introduction).
Figure 3: A 2-integrated star graph with B2 = (r − 1)n and C2 = (r − 1)n+ 1.
For k = 3, we can achieve the lower bounds B3 = r(r−1)/2 and C3 = r by selecting
one node from each local graph, which will be the only central node belonging to his
community. This node and is connected to all other central nodes of each other local
graph. Therefore, we create a complete graph among each of the r central nodes. We
call the corresponding global graph an “extended star graph”. An example appears in
Figure 4.
Figure 4: A 3-connected extended star graph with B3 =
r(r−1)
2
and C3 = r.
For k-integrated graphs for k ≥ 3, Ck remains equal to r whereas Bk keeps decreasing
up to r − 1. Figure 2 in the Introduction shows how to construct the corresponding
k-integrated graphs. When k = r + 1, if there exists r − 1 bridges connecting the r
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central nodes, there is a path from any two central nodes with length at most r − 1.
In an extended star graph, this implies that the maximum distance between any two
nodes is r + 1, and thus the graph becomes (r+ 1)-integrated, as depicted in subfigure
1g.
The authors declare that they have no conflict of interest. This research did not
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